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COMMENTARY 
Myth and reality in industrial relations : 
moderates, militants and social contracts 
Pat Walsh* 
Two Conferences 
Betw~een May 4 and May 7, 1982, two Federation of Labour conferences w~ere held. 
One conference took place in th~e nation's mass media; the other took place on the floor of 
the Wellington To·wn Hall. The differences between th~e two conferences were striking and 
instructive. A few examples should illustrate this: 
in the ' 'media conference", the overwhelmingly important question that absorbed dele-
gates was th~e campaign by "moderate" groups to wrest back control within the FOL 
from the "new militants''; in the "Town Hall conference" delegates spent the great 
majority of their time absorbed in exl1austive debate on ''bread and butter" issues -
unemployment, inflation, the minimum living wage, Closer Economic Relations with 
Australia (CER), world peace, and the wage/tax trade-off. 
in the "m~edia conference", the culmination of this campaign, and the living symbol of 
this intensely divided conference, was the "moderates'" attempt to censure the FOL 
leadership for its participation in th~e lOth World Trade Union ~Congress in Cuba earlier 
this year; in the '"Town Hall conference", fully 74 percent of votes cast supported the 
existing F~OL policy that encourages participation in such conferences. 
in the '"media conference", the FOL leadership rode roughshod over delegates, and on 
the last day suppressed open debate by restricting the time available for discussion of 
remits, and limiting debate to two speakers for and against each remit; in the "Town 
Hall conference" an almost day-long debate on the wag~e/tax trade-off, and a half-day 
debate on un~employment featured numerous delegates, many granted extensions of 
time, speaking on all aspects of the two issues; on the last day of the "Town Hall 
conference", delegates spent almost six hours discussing the .differ~ent recommenda-
tions on remits brought down by the Remit Committees, in many cases taking the 
opportunity to discuss yet again issues already raised in debate on the President's and 
Secretary's R~eports. 
in the "media conference", the third day was dull and uneventful, highlighted only by 
a fiery exchange on the affairs of the Wellington Boilertnaker's Society; on the third 
day of the "Town Hall conference", delegates had been left drained by a passionate 
half.-day debate on unemployment that culminated in a dramatic address by an un-
employed worker representative that was received in an uncanny and emotion-filled 
silen~ce by the 384 delegates present. 
The two conferences - the "media conference" and the "Town Hall confer~ence" 
proceeded side by side, sometimes touching each other, but always liable to veer off in 
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remarkably different directions. There are several reasona for this. One of the mOlt 
important of these is the nature of the media's conception and understanding of industrial 
relations. The media choose to characterize industrial relations as being about 
conflict. Not only is conflict a highly marketable commodity but the upon it often 
makes easier the job of a reporter charged with the daunting)y complex task of condensing 
a complicated industrial issue into two columns of print or three minutes of air-time. 
Very often, of course, this emphasis upon conflict is quite appropriate since most of the 
key issues in the union/employer relationship do involve conflict. But when carried over to 
the reporting of a trade union conference, this strea upon conffict is Ukely to be more 
inaccurate than accurate. At a union conference most of the delegates are on the same side 
most of the time. This is not to deny the importance of conflict within trade unions. Such 
conflict has been a major source of change, both positive and negative, in the development 
of the New Zealand trade union movement and there certainly was conflict at the 1982 
FOL Conference, but it was of a minor nature. The minority faction never commanded the 
support of more than one-quarter of delegates, and even then, their conflict with the great 
majority of delegates was focuaed on a small number of issues. 
Despite this, the media searched endlessly for conflict: television cameras rolled on cue 
whenever a member of the minority faction approached the microphone; a "Checkpoint" 
radio interviewer plaintively asked her reporter - "Can we hope for any fueworks 
tomorrow?"; and following the conference, television's "Close-up" gave detailed and 
sympathetic coverage to the strategies of the minority faction. In fact, however, the great 
bulk of delegates' time and energies at the 1982 FOL conference was taken up with issues 
that expressed their united opposition to their common enemies - their employers and the 
government. But the dominant impression gained from the media was of a significantly and 
bitterly divided conference. This was a myth - a myth born of the media's quenchless 
preoccupation with conflict. Out of this preoccupation emerged the two conferences -
"media conference" and ''Town Hall conference" - myth and reality in industrial 
relations. 
• 
The Town Hall Conference 
The 1982 FOL conference will be rementbered primarily for the debate over the Govern-
ment's proposal for a wage/tax trade-off. This was the reality of the conference - a trade 
union movement giving consideration to a political and economic issue of enonnous 
significance. The nature of this debate, and what it tells us about the New Zealand trade 
union movement ensures that the 1982 FOL conference will be of enduring importance for 
industrial relations in New Zealand. 
A wage/tax' trade-off is a fon11 of incomes policy and, as such, continues the recent 
tradition of incomes policies in New Zealand that began with the Stabilisation of 
Remuneration Act in 1971. But in one vital respect, the Government's policy in this case 
has differed from previous incomes policies. Those policies rarely, if ever, involved any 
significant degree of consultation by government with trade unions and employers. Instead, 
they were introduced by unllateral government action. It has been argued that this lack of 
consultation was an important reason for their failure and that the incomes policies of the 
1970s foundered on union and employer resistance. The degree of consultation involved in 
the proposal for a wage/tax trade-off constitutes a recognition by government that it is no 
longer desirable to try to enforce incomes policies unilaterally. For the fust time a New 
Zealand government had proposed a social contract. 
But overseas experience has shown that social contracts pose their own particular 
problems. Where they have been introduced by agreement between government and union 
and etltployer elites without any consultation with their membership, especially union 
membership, they have encountered major problems through this lack of membership 
commitment. These elite agreeJJtents have also provoked deep divisions within trade union 
movements through membership hostility to union leaders whom they regard as having 
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sold them out. 'fhe detertnination of the FOL leadership to submit theGovernment's 
proposal for a social contract - the wage/tax trade-off - to its annual conference 
constitutes an effort to forestall these problems. 
Thus, the conference debate, as much as the decision to reject the proposal, was of great 
significance for industrial relations in New Z~ealand. It represented the first active involve-
ment by trade unions in the introduction of an incomes policy; and it represent~ed an 
awar~eness by trade union leadership, that in the absenoe of membership approval, their 
own consent to theGovernment'sproposal would be counter-productive. For these reasons, 
the confer~ence debate and the reasons why union delegates overwhelmingly reJected the 
proposal warrant close scrutiny. 
The Debate 
The wage/tax trade-off debate occupied most of the second day of the conference. 
F~OL economist Alf Kirk, spok~e to a seventeen-page paper for more than an hour, and then 
answered delegate's questions. Kirk frrst examined the Government's proposal in isolation 
from other factors. He noted that in general, a trade-off based upon a higher tax-cut 
offered more ben~efits to lower-paid workers. Assuming a $7 per week tax cut (the approxi-
mate mid-point of the two extremes of the Government's proposal) Kirk showed tl1at 70 
percent of workers would benefit, and 30 percent would lose from the Government's 
proposal. However, the net benefits would not be large for each individual worker. At tl1e 
average wage ($14,700) the net weekly gain would be 84 cents. (For a $5 tax cut the 
average wage-earner would gain 58 cents, wl1ile for a $10 tax cut the weekly gain would be 
$1.10.) 
Thus, the money-wage gain for ~eacl1 worker would be small, but if th~e wage/tax trade-
off significantly reduced inflation, as tl1e Government claimed, then the real wage gain 
would be greater. However, Kirk showed that the impact of the trade-off upon inflation 
would be minor, and that even this minor impact is not assur~ed. With a $7 per week tax 
cut, the trade-off leads to an overall reduction in wage settlements of 4.2 percent. Using 
the Government Statistician's calculation that one-tltird of each percentage increase in 
inflation stems from each single percentage increase in wages, he pointed out that a wage 
settlement reduction of 4.2 percent will only reduce inflation by 1.4 perc~ent. But even this 
modest reduction is far from assur~ed since it depends upon tl1e wage settlement reductions 
being reflected in a slower rate of price increases. There is no forn1al mechanism in the 
~Government's proposal to ensure that this actually happens. A r~elated issue, noted by Kirk, 
is that those who derive their incom~e from souroes other than negotiated wage agr~eements 
also benefit from the tax reduction, but make no trade-off by a reduction in income. In 
effect th~ey win twice. 
Kirk emphasized that the trade-off cannot be considered in isolation from other factors. 
The Government's proposal would reduce Government revenue by something between 
$300 million and $700 million. 'This reduction could lead to one of the three outcomes: 
(1) The Government may fmance the cut in personal income tax by increased indirect 
taxation. This would hurt lower-paid workers who spend proportionally more of their 
income and would incur more sales tax. (2) Tl1e Government could finance the cuts in tax 
revenue by reducing its spending on healtl1, education and welfare, and other government 
services that ben.efit work~ers. In this case workers are worse off because the provision of 
government services is reduced, and th~e social wage is lov.lered. It also increases unenlploy-
ment. (3) The revenue cuts could be fmanced by increased government borrowing. This 
generates inflationary pressures that erode real wages and leave workers worse off. Tl1us, 
Kirk concluded, the trade-off is a fonn of "supplementary minimum prices" for employers -
a government subsidy on the wages they pay wl1ich is financed either out of taxes paid by 
workers, or by government borrowing. 
Kirk went on to consider the trade-off in relation to proposals for tax reform, and to 
evaluate the impact of possible tax reform on the distribution of gains and losses. He 
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examined the "most likely " of tax reform, involving a raising of the income levels 
which different marginal tax rates take effect. In this , the 35 percent nwginal 
rate would apply to income between $5,500 and $16,000, a 48 percent rate to &&&"'''••· 
between ·$16,001 and $22,000, and a 55 percent rate on income between $22,001 -&· 
$32,000. Using again the example of a $7 per week tax cut, the proportion of workers 
would then benefit from the trade-off is reduced from 70 percent to SO percent. In 
case the average wage-earner now loses 70 cents a week. AJ weD u this, he pointed out 
further unfavourable effect. The pressure for lov.er marginal tax rates would be 
because total tax paid is lower with the trade-off in effect. This would leave in place 
current distribution of the tax burden which has shifted progressively onto workers in 
last decade. 
Kirk fmished by relating these economic arguments to political and industrial ---....... "-rg_ 
tions. He pointed out that should the conference reject the proposal, theGovemment 
would almost certainly enforce it by legislating for wage controls and the trade-off 
proposed, and would break off union discussions with Government on wider issues, includ-
ing fJSCal policy. He stated that delegates must decide: (a) whether the economic costs he 
had outlined would in fact be incurred if the proposal was accepted; and (b) if so, whether 
these costs were worth incwring in order to avoid the consequences of rejection. 
Kirk was followed by David Thorp, Chain11an of the Combined State Unions, who read 
out the CSlrs decision to reject the trade-off in its present for1n - particularly in the 
absence of any forntal mechanistn to preserve government services. In the ensuing debate 
there was general acceptance of Kirk's economic arguments. 
By mid-afternoon a consensus had emerged that the costs of approval were 
unacceptable. Indeed delegates felt that they were so obviously unacceptable that the 
Government could not seriously have expected approval. This led them to consider 
whether the Government actually hoped for rejection so as to provide a stick with which 
to beat the unions in a possible snap election. A tentative suggestion that if this was the 
case, the conference should vote for conditional acceptance was however received nega-
tively. Delegates pointed out that the proposal had to be considered on its merits, and that 
they could not be drawn into speculation over the Government's electoral strategy. 
Debate moved to consideration of the implications of rejection. It was generally 
accepted that rejection would lead to legislated wage controls, including the trade-off. 
A consensus emerged that this would have to be tolerated as a price of rejection. Delegates 
argued that they could not be seen to have accepted a proposal which was so demonstrably 
unfair to their members. On the other hand, the injustice of wage controls could mobilize 
the membership into enhanced commitment and active support for the union movement's 
resistance to the legislation. There was also a feeling that wage controls had proven ineffec-
tive in the past, and might prove similarly ineffective again. Delegates seemed to feel that 
acceptance damned them to hell, while rejection damned them to purgatory. Thus, rejec-
tion offered at least the long-te11n hope of salvation. The Executive's motion was moved 
by the President, Jim Knox. It rejected the proposal and called for a campaign of action 
to resist the trade-off. (See appendix for full text.) The executive motion was passed 
almost unanimously and the wage/tax trade-off was rejected. 
Other Issues 
Despite the fundamental importance of the wage/tax trade-off proposal, delegates were 
inevitably concerned with a wide range of other issues. Not surprisingly, in view of the 
current economic crisis, the trade union movement showed itself to be preoccupied with 
fundamental economic issues. As noted eulier, delegates spent almost a half-day explicitly 
debating the issue of unemployment, which was also a recurring theme in other discussions. 
A motion that all affiliated unions should contribute one percent of their revenues to 
assistance for the unemployed, through their Trades Council was passed unanimously. It 
appeared that New Zealand's trade unions had taken to heart the costly lessons learnt 
in the 1930s when splits developed between the Unemployed Workers' Movement and the 
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(numerically smaller) trade union movement. The conference also endorsed a remit 
opposing the Government's industry restructuring programme, and expressed its opposition 
to CER as serving the interests of monopolies and multinationals. Concern was expressed 
at th~e lack of available information about CER, and the representative from the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions assured delegates that the ACTU would pass on infortrtation made 
available to it by the Australian ~Government, but withheld from the FOL by the New 
Zealand Government. The conference again endorsed the F'OL's Alternativ~e Economic 
Strategy, and urged that Trades Councils and their affiliates become more actively involved 
in this. Other basic economic issues such as the cost of living, the minimum living wage, 
youth rates, and redundancy were also widely discussed. 
It was predict~ed in some quarters that international affairs would gen~erate considerable 
controversy. However, with regard to the key question of FOL attendance at World 
Federation of Trade Union (WFTU) conferences the right-wing faction led by Neary 
(North Island El~ectrical Workers) and Trott (Harbour Boards Workers) were in a clear 
minority. Trott himself had to bear a stinging attack from Meatworkers' secr~etary Blue 
Kennedy for his role in organizing the anti-union faction at Oringi. It is probable that this 
did not help the cause of the right-wing. 
The Chile trade ban issue was resolved, with President Jim Knox being instructed by tl1e 
conference to take up the question with tl1e International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) and to lift the ban if this seems appropriate. It appeared that this was a 
face-saving compromise that could be accepted by all sides. Once it became clear that the 
key unions involved in enforcing the ban were opposed to its continuation, then the likeli-
hood of such a compromise fo11nula was high. The Polish issue received considerable 
attention, but again, did not create great controversy. The conference accepted the Policy 
Committe~e's recommendation to delete a reference in tl1e Electrical Workers' remit to the 
Polish military being "directed" by the Soviet Union, and to witl1draw a call in the 
Watersiders' r~emit for a national day of protest to support the Polish workers. The confer-
ence reaffirn1ed its opposition to nuclear arms and nuclear testing, and endorsed the 
principle of a Pacific Trade Union Forum. Delegates also condemned the 1981 Springbok 
Tour, and congratulated the protest organisers and participants as constituting "th~e largest 
and most representative movement of ilie people of this country ever seen". 
Two notable concerns of th~e conference were witl1 the issues of trade union ~education 
and membership mobilization. The increasing priority given to these concerns appears to 
reflect the new directions being brought about by th~e Knox/Douglas leadership. In his 
Presidential Address, Knox argued that: ''Central to the development of the trade union 
movement at the present time is th~e need for a co-ordinated strategy of trade union educa-
tion". He categorized the need to build up grassroots organization as tl1e "most important" 
policy issue currently facing the trade union movement. These concerns were also 
prominent in the wage/tax trade-off debate, particularly in the motion wltich rejected th~e 
trade-off. This motion called for a general campaign of action both to resist the trade-off 
and to pr~ess for the minimum living wage, based upon a programme of trade union 
education and membership mobilization. Delegates stressed the n~eed to explain the reasons 
for rejection to the membership, and to ensure that the membership was mobilized to 
support that rejection. It would appear that these changes, stimulated by the new leader-
ship, are associated with a realization that New ,Zealand's unions can no longer shelter 
behind the arbitration system, but must rely upon their own resources. 
There ·were eight candidates for four Executive positions. Despite speculation that key 
unions would withdraw their support for Bill Andersen (Northern Drivers), he was 
comfortably reelected. The other sitting candidates were also easily reelected - Ernie Ball 
(Engineers), Ashley Russ (Carpenters) and Wes Cameron (Meatworkers). The issue of 
Labour Party/trade union links was not prominent at the conference. Despite his state-
ments criticizing the nature of the relationship, Bill Rawling was received about as warn1ly 
as a Labour Party leader could expect to be after three successive electoral defeats. 
Rowling raised the issue of union/party links, but this did not seem to provoke any great 
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interest. It appeared that delegates were m011 with attendJag to basic trade 
union issues, and those concemed with the party relationship prepared to reserve 
that concern for the Labour Party coaference the 9Jeek. A tub-thumping piece 
of traditional oratory by DaYld I.anp, attacking goVernment policy and drawing upon the 
poverty and misery caused by those poBcies, especiaJly in Ids own electorate of Mangere, 
aroused more enthusiasm from deleptes. 
Conclusion 
Despite media myths, the 1982 FOL Conference. revealed the existence of a consider-
able measure of unity with;n the trade union movement. Dissent was largely restricted to 
a minority faction led by the North Island Electrical Workers. However, it appears that 
they felt strongly enough about the issue of FOL links to the WFTU to persuade them to 
consider withdrawal from the FOL at their 1983 conference. The heated debates that 
occurred over a number of issues appeared to demonstrate the vitality of the union move-
ment more than the exist~nce of fundamental divisions. For the most part, delegates shared 
a common perception of the issues confronting New Zealand's trade union movement. This 
was that current Government poHcy seems systematically to shift the burden of the 
depression onto the shoulders of the workers. In these circumstances, trade union move-
ments always tend to close ranks and to concentrate on fundamental economic issues in an 
effort to respond to these developments. This conference was no exception. 
Appendix 
FEDERATION OF LABOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON WAGE/TAX 'I"RADE-OFF 
The national executive, after careful consideration of the Government's proposals for a 
wage/tax trade-off, recommends that they be rejected. 
It is the opinion of the national executive that the proposals are not in the interest of 
workers, beneficiaries and superannuitants who are to suffer reductions in wages while the 
business, commercial and investment sectors are not confronted with any such 
commitment. 
The proposal is not acceptable because its cost will be borne by workers in three ways. 
Firstly, the trade-off only affects workers not employers. Secondly, it reduces the 
possibility of Government action to benefit workers, and thirdly, it removes the likelihood 
of genuine tax refotnt. This difficulty arises because the proposal has been developed in 
isolation from other economic considerations, and for any such trade-off to be beneficial 
it must be linked with Government commitment to a just economic policy. 
The national executive recommends to affiliates and trades councils that a campaign 
be entered into under the direction and control of the national executive. This campaign 
to focus on: 
1. the harmful effects of this wage/tax trade-off; 
2. the right to free bargaining and opposition to the imposition of wage controls; 
3. the need for a minimum living wage; 
4. the right to cost of living adjustments and access to the Arbitration Court for such cases; 
5. the effects ofGovernment'scuts and the need for genuine tax refortll. 
